Brooklyn Journal of International Law
Volume 3 | Issue 2

Article 8

1977

CASE COMMENT: United States v. Flores
Sara Schoenwetter

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil
Recommended Citation
Sara Schoenwetter, CASE COMMENT: United States v. Flores, 3 Brook. J. Int'l L. (1977).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol3/iss2/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

CASE COMMENTS
United States v. Flores-The United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit confirmed that the doctrine of specialty does
not bind the United States, as requesting State, to a limitation
imposed by a Spanish extradition order where the limitation does
not concern the nature of the offense for which the extradited
fugitive may be tried, but instead attempts to impose restrictions
upon evidentiary or procedural rules.
INTRODUCTION

Extradition by treaty is a relatively new means of obtaining
the return of a fugitive from justice. Prior to the existence of
treaties providing for extradition, the rendition of fugitives was
accomplished on the basis of international reciprocity, or comity.,
Whether extradition is obtained on the basis of comity or by
treaty,2 the requested State is protected against abuse of its extradition order by the international legal doctrine of specialty. 3 This
protection arises from the right of the requested State, under that
doctrine, to limit the prosecution of the fugitive to the extradition
offense. 4
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
recently considered whether Spain, by its extradition order, could
determine the admissibility of evidence of the prosecutable offense under the doctrine of specialty in the same manner as it
might limit the nature and scope of the offense. In United States
v. Flores,' the Second Circuit, holding that such a limitation has
1. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 411 (1886). Rendition by comity is still
practiced today. However, as the Supreme Court has pointed out, "while a government
may, if agreeable to its own constitution and laws, voluntarily exercise the power to
surrender a fugitive from justice . . . , the legal duty to demand his extradition and the
correlative duty to surrender him . . . exist only when created by treaty." Factor v.
Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933) (citations omitted). The United States very rarely
requests extradition on the basis of comity because, by statute, it is prohibited from
reciprocating, that is, it may not extradite in the absence of a treaty with the requesting
State. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1970). Cf. Fiocconi v. Attorney Gen., 462 F.2d 475 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972) (extradition requested by United States on basis of comity).
2. Fiocconi v. Attorney Gen., 462 F.2d at 479.
3. United States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1962). See text accompanying notes 26-35 infra.
4. W. FRIEDMANN, 0. LissrrzyN, & R. PUGH, INTERNATIONAL LAW 493 (1969).
5. 538 F.2d 939 (2d Cir.), modifying 411 F. Supp. 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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no effect upon the American forum,' refused to expand the modern construction of the doctrine of specialty "to permit foreign
intrusion into the evidentiary or procedural rules of the requisitioning State."'
I.

BACKGROUND

During the late 1960's and early 1970's, Antonio Flores,
among others, was the subject of an ongoing investigation by the
United States government into international narcotics traffic. He
was reputed to have been the sole American buyer for 600 pounds
of heroin worth $65 million.' Flores was indicted in the United
States district courts for both the eastern9 and southern' districts
of New York [hereinafter referred to as Eastern District and
Southern District, respectively] for his alleged participation in a
conspiracy to import and distribute narcotics." After his French
supplier was arrested in April 1971, and before Flores' trial on the
Eastern District indictment, however, he fled the United States
for France, then Spain.' 2 Shortly after the Southern District indictment was returned (almost two years after he had left the
United States), the United States requested Flores' extradition
from Spain. In proceedings lasting nearly eight months, Flores
unsuccessfully fought extradition. On November 13, 1973, the
Provincial Court of Barcelona issued the requested extradition
order.'3
The extradition order was peculiar in one respect. In construing the applicable extradition treaty,'4 the Spanish court held
that Flores could be prosecuted only for a conspiracy that existed
after September 3, 1970, the effective date of an international
agreement to control narcotics' 5 to which Spain had recently become a contracting party. 6 Therefore, Flores was not extraditable
6. Id. at 944-45.
7. Id. at 944.
8. N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1976, at B3, col. 4.
9. Indictment No. 70 CR 543 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 1970).
10. Indictment No. 73 CR 19 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8,1973).
11. Both indictments charged single-count conspiracies involving many defendants.
12. Brief for Appellant at 6.

13.
Limited
14.
15.

Limited Proceedings No. 53 of 1973, Barcelona Court No. 6 [hereinafter cited as
Proceedings], reprintedin Brief for Appellant at A-34-42.
See text accompanying notes 52-75 infra.
Convention for the Suppression of Dangerous Drugs, opened for signature June

26, 1936, 198 L.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter cited as 1936 Convention].

16. Limited Proceedings, supra note 13, at 3, 4.
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to the Eastern District because the conspiracy charged there existed between January and August 1968, a period prior to the
effective date of the agreement." The Southern District indictment had charged a conspiracy stretching from January 1968 to
April 1971, in which two of the eleven overt acts in furtherance
of the conspiracy occurred after September 3, 1970. On this basis,
the Spanish court ordered Flores returned to the Southern District but required that the United States promise not to try him
8
for acts committed prior to the effective date of the agreement.'
Flores was not extradited to the United States until February
1976' 9 upon completing a prison sentence imposed on him by
Spain for possession of marijuana and a forged passport. 0 At a
pre-trial conference in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, soon after his arrival in the
United States, Flores moved to exclude evidence of all acts allegedly committed by himself and his co-conspirators prior to September 3, 1970 on the ground that the doctrine of specialty required literal construction of the extradition order. 2' District
Judge Dudley B. Bonsal ruled that Flores' prior acts merely constituted evidence of the "defendant's knowledge and intent" concerning the conspiracy and, as such, were admissible. 2 At a
subsequent conference, however, the court ruled that evidence of
23
the defendant's co-conspirators' prior acts would be excluded.
24
The Government, at Judge Bonsal's repeated urgings, appealed.
17. Id. at 4.
18. Id. at 7. A diplomatic communiqu6 from the United States to Spain conveyed
"the specific assurance on the part of the Department of Justice that Antonio Flores will
not be prosecuted . . . for prior infractions or infractions different than those which are
concretely referred to by the decision portion of the [extradition order] . . . ." Verbal
Note No. 136 from the United States Embassy to the Spanish Ministry of Exterior Affairs
(Feb. 13, 1974), reprinted in Brief for Appellant at A-43.
19. 538 F.2d at 941-42.
20. Limited Proceedings, supra note 13, at 7.
21. 538 F.2d at 942.
22. 411 F. Supp. at 39.
23. 538 F.2d at 942.
24. Id. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1970), the Government may file an interlocutory
appeal from a pre-trial decision excluding evidence. The Second Circuit held that the
appeal was not time barred because it was filed within thirty days of the oral rulings. 538
F.2d at 942-43.
At the pre-trial conference of April 19, 1976, Assistant United States Attorney John
Flannery attempted to elicit from the trial court the effect its suppression order would
have on certain evidence the Government wished to introduce at trial. The court repeatedly suggested that the issue be raised on appeal; thus, it would appear that the court
realized that its ruling might have been incorrect. See Brief for Appellant at A-147-69.
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In United States v. Flores, the Second Circuit held that evidence
of prior acts committed by any of the co-conspirators was admissible.25
1-.

THE DOCTRINE OF SPECIALTY

The international legal doctrine of specialty has been defined
as a limiting principle "placed upon the requesting state that it
may try and punish an extradited person only for the act for
which extradition is obtained.

'2

The doctrine was first enunci-

ated in the United States in United States v. Rauscher,7 a case
turning on the construction of an extradition treaty between the
United States and Great Britain. The Supreme Court held that
the treaty limited the prosecution of a person extradited pursuant
to the treaty to the offense charged in the extradition request
2
despite the absence of a provision to that effect in the treaty.
The Rauscher Court considered the doctrine to be "an appropriate adjunct to the discretionary exercise of the power of rendition
...
. It is unreasonable that the country of asylum should be
expected to deliver up such person to be dealt with by the demanding government without any limitation, implied or otherwise, upon its prosecution of the party.""
The specialty doctrine represents an international policy designed to protect the "dignity and interests" of the asylum State"
25. 538 F.2d at 945.
26. Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Conventionon Extradition,art. 23,
Comment, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 15, 213 (Supp. 1935). See Note, The Status of Political
Fugitives and Refugees under United States Law, 2 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 266, 267-68
(1976).
27. 119 U.S. 407 (1886). This decision reflected difficulties which arose between the
United States and Great Britain over the extradition of Ezra Winslow, an American
citizen arrested in Great Britain. The British Parliament had enacted a statute in 1870
which allowed extradition only in those cases in which the United States was specifically
prohibited by its law from prosecuting the fugitive for any but the offense named in the
extradition order. The Extradition Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 52, § 3. As a result, Great
Britain refused to grant Winslow's extradition. Hamilton Fish, then Secretary of State,
wrote to the charg6 ad interim at the American Embassy in London: "Surely Great Britain
will not allow the legislature of another state to prescribe or to limit the cases, or the
manner in which justice is to be administrated in her courts, and she will not expect the
United States to be less tenacious of its independence in this regard." Letter from Hamilton Fish to Wickham Hoffman (Mar. 31, 1876), reprinted in 34 FoREIGN REL. U.S. 210,
215 (1876). See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 415-16.
28. 119 U.S. at 422-23.
29. Id. at 419.
30. Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 906 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884
(1973). Accord, Judgment of May 12, 1961, 87 Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen Bun.
desgerichts, Amtliche Sammlung IV, at 57 (Switz. 1961), 34 I.L.R. 132 (1961).
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"against abuse of its discretionary act of extradition."3 The
Rauscher Court stated that a violation of the doctrine of specialty
carried "an implication of fraud upon the rights of the party
extradited, and of bad faith to the country which permitted his
extradition. ' 32 In such a case, the Court suggested, the requested
State or the extradited individual himself may demand, and is
33
entitled to, his release.
In interpreting Rauscher, however, the Second Circuit has
determined that the doctrine represents merely a "privilege of the
asylum state . . rather than a right accruing to the accused."34
The appropriate test for determining whether the extradited individual is being tried for a crime other than that for which he was
extradited is "whether the extraditing country would consider the
offense actually tried 'separate'" when it is not clear that the
prosecuted offense is "truly unrelated" to the extradition of3
fense . 1
Because Flores was charged with conspiracy, the question of
whether the doctrine of specialty applied in this case was complicated by the implication in the extradition order that the Spanish
court considered the overt acts listed in the conspiracy indictment to be separate offenses. By analogy, if Flores had been
31. United States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1962).
32. 119 U.S. at 422.
33. Id. at 430-31. In 1907, an individual extradited from Canada to serve a term of
imprisonment to which he had been sentenced after trial in an American court was
released and returned to Canada. The crime for which he had been extradited was not
the crime for which he had been convicted; the latter was a non-extraditable offense under
the applicable treaty, but the former, with which he had been charged solely for the
purpose of extradition, was extraditable. In Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309 (1907), the
Supreme Court held that he must be discharged.
34. Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 906 (2d Cir. 1973); United States ex rel.
Donnelly v. Mulligan, 76 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1935) (rights of asylum and immunity arising
under extradition treaty belong to State, not to criminal).
Since the requested state is designed to benefit from this doctrine and has the
right to claim its enforcement, the question arises as to the right of the relator
to insist on that requirement as a participant in the process. In practice, when
the issue arises the relator will have already been surrendered . . . [to] the
prosecuting state. His . . . only recourse at that point will be limited to the
remedies afforded by that very state. Thus, unless the surrendering state objects
to the variance, the individual in question will not really benefit from this
doctrine.
M.

BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBuc ORDER

354-55 (1974). Cf.

Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1975) (rights accrue to extradited individual
for benefit of requested State).
35. 299 F.2d at 490-91.
36. Actually, Spain's definition of conspiracy is very similar to that utilized by various American states in their penal codes. The Spanish definition states that "[la con-
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charged with multiple counts of forgery, and some act of forgery
had occurred outside the American forum's statute of limitations, 7 the Spanish court would have been justified, under a 1904
treaty, in limiting extradition to those crimes that could be lawfully prosecuted in the American forum.3 1 If one of the forgeries
had occurred prior to the effective date of the treaty, the Spanish
court could have extradited Flores on the condition that he not
be tried for that offense. The justification for either limitation
would have rested on the terms of the extradition treaty and the
doctrine of specialty. The issue, in this hypothetical case, would
have been whether Spain could have made a valid objection,
under the doctrine of specialty, to the introduction into evidence
of the prior act of forgery, for which Flores could not have been
extradited, as going to the defendant's motive, opportunity, or
intent.3 9 The court would have held the objection without merit
since he was being tried only for the offenses for which extradition
was granted.
The same analysis was appropriate with respect to the conspiracy charge in this case. An indictment for conspiracy, brought
in federal court in the United States, enumerates overt acts allegedly committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. Such acts alone
may not be criminal; however, when viewed as acts in furtherance
of a criminal purpose, they become evidence of the conspiracy."
In addition, at the trial of a conspiracy charge, evidence of acts
spiraci6n existe cuando dos o mds personas se conciertan para la ejecuci6n de un delito y
resuelven ejecutarlo." Decree No. 691 (Mar. 28, 1963), Codigo Penal, art. 4 (2d ed. 1971)
(Spain) (a conspiracy exists when two or more persons agree upon the execution of a crime

and resolve to execute the same) (author's translation). In New York, "[a] person is
guilty of conspiracy .. .when, with intent that conduct constituting a crime be performed, he agrees with one or more persons to engage in or cause performance of such
conduct." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 105.00 (McKinney 1975). Accord, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
38, § 8-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); OR.REv. STAT. § 161.450 (1975). Nevertheless, it is

possible that the definition is applied differently by Spanish courts.
37. In reality, under 18 U.S.C. § 3290 (1970), there is no statute of limitations applic-

able to the prosecution of fugitives from justice.
38. Extradition Treaty, June 15, 1904, United States-Spain, 35 Stat. 1947, T.S. No.
492, at art. V [hereinafter cited as 1904 Treaty].
39. FED. R. EVID. 404(b). See 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 370 (3d ed. 1940).
40. The eleven overt acts alleged in the indictment in this case are a good example
of the possibly innocent character of acts in furtherance of a conspiracy. The indictment
charges that various co-conspirators "arrived in the vicinity" of specified hotels on speci.
fied dates, sometimes in the possession of large sums of money. One overt act is a conspira.
tor's entry into St. Patrick's Cathedral in New York. A somewhat less innocent activity
is charged in the allegation that one co-conspirator received the shipping papers and a
parking receipt for a car containing 93 kilograms of heroin. Indictment No. 73 CR 19
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 1973).
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either prior to the passage of a statute making the goal of the
conspiracy a crime 4 or falling outside the period of the conspiracy
charged (as long as one overt act occurs within the statute of
limitations4 2) is admissible to show the motive and intent of the
conspirators" and the existence and purpose of the conspiracy."
Since Spanish law permits extradition only in the presence
of a treaty in force at the time the offense was committed,4 5 the
Spanish court tried to restrict Flores' prosecution by limiting the
extradition offense to acts committed after a certain date. 6 The
Second Circuit did not reverse" the district court's decision, to
which the Government had offered no protest, that the Government must prove that a conspiracy existed between that date and
the last date named in the indictment. However, it was the
opinion of the Second Circuit that this requirement would not
compel a United States court to adhere to the terms of the extradition order when the result would be to suppress evidence which
demonstrated the existence and purpose of the conspiracy.4 9 The
court also held that the doctrine of specialty would not be available to Spain to protest non-compliance.5 0 If the doctrine of spe41. E.g., United States v. Fino, 478 F.2d 35, 38 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
918 (1974).
42. E.g., Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 396 (1957).
43. E.g., United States v. Brettholz, 485 F.2d 483, 487 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 976 (1974).
44. E.g., United States v. Ferrara, 458 F.2d 868, 874 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S.
931 (1972).
45. Extradition Law of Dec. 26, 1958, art. 1(1) (Spain). "There is no doubt that, from
the time of [the 1936 Convention's] entry into force, . . . it had the force of law and its
application was an inescapable obligation of the courts." Limited Proceedings, supra note
13, at 3-4.
46. It is curious and inexplicable that on a set of facts very similar to those here,
Spain extradited Frangois Rossi without limiting the extradition order in any way. Rossi
had been indicted in the Eastern District of New York in 1972 for conspiracy to traffic in
narcotics between January 1969 and September 1972. Extradition was requested in February 1973 and granted without any of the complications which arose in Flores' extradition.
According to Assistant United States Attorney Peter Schlam, who represented the Government at Rossi's appeal of his conviction, Flores and Rossi were held in the same
Spanish jail pending extradition and were represented by the same attorney at the extradition proceedings, presumably held before the same court. Conversation between author
and Assistant United States Attorney Schlam (Dec. 6, 1976). See generally United States
v. Rossi, 545 F.2d 814 (2d Cir. 1976).
47. 538 F.2d at 945.
48. 411 F. Supp. at 39.
49. 538 F.2d at 944.
It is clear. . . that even as the specialty doctrine has been defined and broadened in this century, it has never been construed to permit foreign intrusion into
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cialty does not justify the imposition of an evidentiary restriction,
Spain's justification, if it is to be binding upon a United States
court, must lie elsewhere.5 1
III.

THE APPLICABLE EXTRADITION TREATIES

The Spanish court found that its authority to grant Flores'
extradition existed by virtue of not only a bilateral treaty between
the United States and Spain, but also a multilateral convention
designed to control international trafficking in narcotics. 2 Until
1971, the United States and Spain undertook extradition pursuant to a bilateral treaty5 3 [hereinafter referred to as 1904 Treaty]
concluded by the parties in 1904 and effective, as amended by
a protocol signed in 1907, on May 21, 1908. However, the 1904
Treaty alone could not have served as the basis for Flores' extradition because it did not include violations of narcotics laws
among the list of extraditable offenses. 4
Over the past sixty-five years, numerous attempts have been
made to control international traffic in narcotics.55 Nevertheless,
of the more than half-dozen multilateral agreements that have
been concluded, only two conventions have sought to provide a
basis for international extradition of narcotics traffickers. In 1936,
under the auspices of the League of Nations, the Convention for
the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs"
[hereinafter referred to as 1936 Convention] was opened for signature at Geneva; by 1939, with the ratification by the requisite
number of States, the Convention entered into force.
One of the purposes of the 1936 Convention was to create an
enforcement procedure for the provisions of the previous internathe evidentiary or procedural rules of the requisitioning state . . . . Where, as
here, the defendant is indicted and tried for the precise offense contained in the
extradition order . . . , the doctrine does not authorize us to disregard the
normal evidentiary rules followed by this forum.
Id. at 944-45.
50. Id. at 944-45.
51. Id. at 945.
52. Limited Proceedings, supra note 13, at 3-4.
53. 1904 Treaty, supra note 38.
54. Id. art. II.
55. See Waddell, InternationalNarcotics Control, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 310 (1970).
56. 1936 Convention, supra note 15.
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tional agreements concerning narcotics.17 Article 2 provided that
the possession, distribution, and importation of narcotics, where
not otherwise authorized, were to be made severely-punishable
crimes by the contracting parties. Article 9 made such offenses
extraditable by operation of any extradition treaty "which had
been or may thereafter be concluded" between the contracting
parties. However, in recognition of the right of sovereign States
to establish and maintain an independent criminal justice system
free from international control, the 1936 Convention expressly
provided that the parties were not "undertaking. . .to adopt in
criminal matters any form or methods of proof contrary to their
laws" in determining whether or not to extradite.5 1 In addition,
the Convention was not to be understood as "affecting the principle that the offences referred to in Article[] 2 . . .shall in each
country be defined, prosecuted and punished in conformity with
the general rules of its domestic law."59
Technically, with respect to its contracting parties, the entire
1936 Convention is still in force. However, the extradition article
was specifically abrogated in 1961 by the United Nationssponsored Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs" [hereinafter
referred to as Single Convention] unless a party to both the 1936
Convention and the Single Convention should decide to retain
the extradition provisions of the former in preference to those of
the latter." To avoid any suggestion that a single criminal justice
system was sought to be imposed, the language of the Single
Convention was chosen as carefully as that of the 1936 Convention. 2 Article 36 specifies that a contracting party is bound by the
57. "One loophole in the new system [of international narcotics control] was the
ineffectiveness of sanctions in dealing with traffickers. The [1936 Convention] tried to
obligate the contracting parties to adopt in their penal systems principles aimed at deterring traffickers." Waddell, supra note 55, at 313 (footnote omitted).
The 1936 Convention was specifically designed
to strengthen the measures intended to penalise offences contrary to the provi-

sions of the International Opium Convention signed at The Hague on January
23rd, 1912, the Geneva Convention of February 19th, 1925, and the Convention

for limiting the Manufacture and regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs
signed at Geneva on July 13th, 1931. ...
Preamble to 1936 Convention, supra note 15.
58. 1936 Convention, supra note 15, art. 13.
59. Id. art. 15.

60. Done Mar. 30, 1961, [1967] 18 U.S.T. 1407, T.I.A.S. No. 6298, 520 U.N.T.S. 151
(effective with respect to the United States June 24, 1967, and with respect to Spain Mar.

1, 1966) [hereinafter cited as Single Convention].
61. Id. art. 44.
62. See Waddell, supra note 55, at 319.
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Single Convention "subject to its constitutional limitations,...
its legal system and domestic law";13 it also reiterates that offenses made extraditable by the Single Convention are to be
"defined, prosecuted and punished in conformity with the domestic law of a Party."'"
The Single Convention entered into force with respect to the
United States in June 1967; the United States never specifically
subscribed to the 1936 Convention. The Spanish court stated that
Spain became a contracting party to the 1936 Convention in September 1970 and that the United States had been a contracting
party to that convention since 1947.5 While it is true that, in
1947, the United States became a party to an international protocol6 amending six previous multilateral agreements concerning
narcotics traffic, including the 1936 Convention, it had been a
party to only two of the six agreements so amended. The parties
to the protocol were merely acceding to the transfer of supervision
from the defunct League of Nations to the newly-formed United
Nations with respect to only those agreements to which they were
already contracting parties. Therefore, as a contracting party to
the protocol, the United States did not become a contracting
party to the agreements amended by the protocol to which it had
7
not previously been a party.1
The Spanish court rejected" the suggestion that extradition
could be granted on the basis of the most recent bilateral extradition treaty between the United States and Spain" [hereinafter
referred to as 1970 Treaty], which had been concluded in 1970
and entered into force in June 1971. Despite the fact that it expressly made extraditable violations of narcotics laws, whether
committed by an individual or as part of a conspiracy,"0 the 1970
Treaty contained an explicit proviso that crimes committed before it entered into force were "subject to extradition pursuant to
the provisions of [the 1904] Treaty . ... ,1 Since the conspira63. Single Convention, supra note 60, art. 36, § 2.
64. Id. § 4.
65. Limited Proceedings, supra note 13, at 3.
66. Protocol Amending Agreements on Narcotic Drugs, opened for signatureDec. 11,
1946, 61 Stat. 2230, T.I.A.S. No. 1671, 12 U.N.T.S. 179.
67. Id. art. I.
68. Limited Proceedings, supranote 13, at 3.
69. Extradition Treaty, May 29, 1970, United States-Spain, [1971] 22 U.S.T. 737,
T.I.A.S. No. 7136 [hereinafter cited as 1970 Treaty].
70. Id. art. II.
71. Id. art. XVIII. The United States probably did not attempt to rely upon the 1970
Treaty because American case law requires strict application of such a provision. In a case
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cies for which Flores had been indicted were alleged to have existed only between 1968 and April 1971, they constituted crimes
committed before the effective date of the 1970 Treaty and were
subject to extradition, if at all, only under the 1904 Treaty.
Because the 1904 Treaty did not provide for extradition for
narcotics offenses, the Spanish court was compelled to look to the
1936 Convention. By its terms, the 1936 Convention's extradition
provisions were to be read back into any extradition treaty which
had been concluded between the parties to the 1936 Convention.12
Therefore, the Spanish court concluded, apparently with some
reluctance, that narcotics offenses were extraditable as a consequence of the incorporation of the 1936 Convention into the 1904
Treaty.73 Refusing to give this result retroactive effect, however,
despite the absence of a specific provision to that effect in either
agreement, the court held that "[i]f it is concluded.

. .

that the

[1904] Treaty is applicable, it is also concluded some limitations
must be clearly stated.

7

4 The

limitation in the extradition order

stated that Flores was to be extradited only for acts committed
after the 1936 Convention had entered into force with respect to
Spain, that is, September 1970.7.
IV.

THE AMERICAN RESPONSE

The United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York was faced with a difficult choice once Flores was
actually extradited pursuant to the 1973 extradition order. The
United States Department of State had conveyed a promise to
Spain not to prosecute Flores "for prior infractions or infractions
different than those which are concretely referred to" by the extradition order.78 The district court was required to balance the
effect to be given the limitation imposed by the order, coupled
with the American assurance of compliance, against the principle
construing the extradition convention with Italy, Judge Blatchford made an examination
of all extradition treaties to which the United States was a party at that time. He concluded that "past crimes would be included, where the language was capable of a construction including them, unless they were expressly excluded." In re DeGiacomo, 7 F.
Cas. 366, 369 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1874) (No. 3747) (emphasis added). See also 6 M. WHITEMAN,

753 (1968).
72. 1936 Convention, supra note 15, art. 9.

DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

73. Limited Proceedings, supra note 13, at 4. See note 18 supra.

74. Limited Proceedings, supra note 13, at 4.
75. Id. at 7.
76. Verbal Note No. 136 from the United States Embassy to the Spanish Ministry of

Exterior Affairs (Feb. 13, 1974), reprintedin Brief for Appellant at A-43.
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that a State's complete control over its internal criminal justice
system is an essential element of its sovereignty." Obviously,
some showing of compliance was mandated, but the precise extent of the compliance required was not clear. Therefore, it is
understandable that the district court suggested that the order
was open to various interpretations and that if the prosecution
did not agree with the court's interpretation, an appeal should be
8
taken.1
On one point, the district court and the Government were in
agreement-that the Government had to prove that the conspiracy existed within the period prescribed by the Spanish court in
its order.7 9 Nevertheless, the court equivocated on the question of
the introduction into evidence of the conspirators' prior acts." Its
final determination was that the order precluded evidence of any
but Flores' acts prior to September 3, 1970.81 The reason for the
distinction is not clear. The Second Circuit concluded that the
court below, "[w]hile acknowledging that such evidentiary restrictions differ from the practice in the 'ordinary case,' ..
felt
itself bound by its reading of the Spanish decree.""
The Second Circuit did not agree with the trial court's ruling.
The Government's argument that a distinction must be drawn
between "the crimes for which Flores may be charged and tried
. . . and the evidence that might be introduced to illuminate and
establish the crimes charged" was more persuasive to the court
of appeals than it had been to the district court. The Second
Circuit's decision clearly demonstrates that it considered this distinction dispositive of the issue: "[U]nless it is unequivocally
clear that Spain was authorized under principles of international
law and intended to limit the manner by which United States
prosecutors might try a conspiracy case, we would feel constrained to follow domestic evidentiary rules." 4
The court's choice of words is either revealing or merely
77. Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Jurisdictionwith
Respect to Crime, art. 3, Comment, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 439, 480-81 (Supp. 1935). Cf. The
License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847) (Taney, C.J.) (police powers of State are
powers of government inherent in,every sovereignty).
78. See note 24 supra; United States v. Flores, 538 F.2d at 942.
79. 538 F.2d at 942.

80. Id.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. See also Brief for Appellant at A-169.
538 F.2d at 942.
Id. at 943.
Id. at 944.
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harmless error. The verb "to constrain" is defined as "to force by
imposed limitation.
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It may be inferred from the use of the word

"constrain" that the court would not be compelled "to follow
domestic evidentiary rules" except in extraordinary circumstances. Such an approach seems illogical. If the court feared that
domestic evidentiary rules would make the Government's case
much simpler of proof, resulting in certain conviction of the defendant, the court was probably correct in its fear. Nevertheless,
such a consideration should not have been entertained by the
court. The issue is whether the court was forced to limit the
application of domestic evidentiary rules in this case, not whether
it was forced to utilize them.
If the court sought an excuse not to apply domestic rules of
evidence, it could have begun with the apparent position of the
Spanish court that overt acts in furtherance of a conspiracy are
separate offenses. In such a case, the question clearly would have
been whether Flores' trial would violate the doctrine of specialty
if evidence of those prior acts was introduced; the answer would
have been that it would have been an act of bad faith to try Flores
for acts specifically excluded by the extradition order. This would
have been so whether the intended consequence of the order was
a limitation on the offense or on the manner of proof. However,
the Second Circuit was no more constrained to follow the Spanish
court's understanding of conspiracy than to limit the manner of
proof in a trial in an American court on the basis of an extradition
order.86
Either lack of firm conviction in the correctness of its decision or fear that Spain would lodge an official protest as a result
of this decision compelled the court to try to determine what
result the Spanish court intended to accomplish by its imposition
of the limitation in this case."7 If it were not Spain's intent to limit
the manner of proof, then Spain could not possibly be offended
if the ordinary evidentiary rules of the forum were applied, notwithstanding that those rules permitted evidence of acts for
which Spain had forbidden prosecution."
85. WEBSTER'S NEw CoLLmTIAE DICrIONARY 243 (8th ed. 1974).

86. See text accompanying notes 49-51 supra.
87. See 538 F.2d at 945. The only evidence of Spanish objection to the proceedings
consisted of two letters from the Spanish Consul General in New York. The court was
"inclined to accept [the] representation" of the United States Attorney that the letters
were not "official intergovernmental communiques." Id. at n.4.
88. This was the Government's position in the court below:
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The Second Circuit relied on two rather weak premises to
infer that Spain merely had intended to limit the scope of the
prosecutable offense. First, "the totality of the circumstances"
provided a means to see through the "ambiguity" of the Spanish
court's language in the extradition order; the Second Circuit
found no intent to limit anything but the scope of the offense."
Second, the language of the 1936 Convention, if applicable to the
grant of extradition, must be applicable to the limitation. If the
Spanish court was obliged to extradite Flores because of the existence of the 1936 Convention, that court was similarly bound by
the terms of the Convention in other matters. Pointing to Articles
13 and 15, the Second Circuit announced that "[w]e are not
persuaded that the Spanish judges, in extraditing Flores pursuant to the [1936] Convention, intended to violate two of its
central proscriptions.""0 Articles 13 and 15 embody the principle
that the Convention does not affect the definition, prosecution,
or punishment of crimes by any party to the Convention.'
CONCLUSION

The decision of the Second Circuit, despite its negative tone,
should settle the issue of whether the doctrine of specialty
imposes an obligation of compliance with a limitation in an extradition order which goes to the manner of proof and not to the
scope and nature of the offense. The court's response was, as
expected, that the doctrine does not require the requisitioning
State to alter any of its domestic rules of evidence or procedure.
Failure to comply with a limitation which would only affect the
manner of proof should not lead to international scandal because
limitation on proof is not included within the scope of the doctrine of specialty. The doctrine "reflects a fundamental concern
of governments that persons who are surrendered should not be
subject to indiscriminateprosecution by the receiving government. 9' 2 Neither Spain nor Flores can complain that, by its deci[I]t is . . . clear that the Spanish public policy rationale in limiting the order
of extradition has to do with insuring that the defendant is convicted only for a
crime which occurred after the effective date of the [1936] Convention . ...
The Spanish court has no interest in the method of proof.
Government's Memorandum of Law at 2.
89. 538 F.2d at 945.

90. Id.
91. See text accompanying notes 58-59 supra.
92. Fiocconi v. Attorney Gen., 462 F.2d at 481 (emphasis added).
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sion, the Second Circuit was subjecting Flores to "indiscriminate
prosecution" by permitting the introduction of certain evidence
pursuant to the rules of the American forum during his trial for
the precise crime for which he was extradited.
Sara C. Schoenwetter

